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The citations and argument set forth within the instant Reply Brief are intended by 
Appellants to be supplemental to those citations and that argument originally advanced within 
Appellants' Opening Brief, dated March 26, 2013, of record herein. Therefore, it is not intended 
that the instant Reply Brief respond to each of the arguments advanced by or within 
Respondent's Brief, dated April 24, 2013, to the extent that any such response would duplicate 
citations or argument previously made by Appellants. 
SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT WITH CITATIONS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of Case 
At pages 1-4 of Respondent's Brief, Respondent-Idaho State Industrial Commission 
(hereafter referenced as "Commission") makes argument, as opposed to merely setting forth and 
describing the Nature of the Case at issue by the instant appeal. Appellants believe it important 
to respond to ce1iain of that argument. 
The Cmmnission argues that LC. § 72-804 enables it to order an employer to pay the 
injured worker's attorney's fees, thereby advancing the legislature's purpose in enacting that 
code section, which the Commission contends was to " ... enable an injured worker to keep her 
entire award of workers' compensation benefits and not to have those benefits lessened by any 
legal expenses,... ." As will be more thoroughly discussed subsequently herein, the 
Appellants' Reply Brief - 1 
Conm1ission's interpretation of the legislature's "purpose" in enacting LC. § 72-804 is short-
sighted at the minimum, if not clearly erroneous. 
It is submitted that the "purpose" of LC. § 72-804 was to act as inducement for a Title 72 
employer and its surety to accept Title 72 claims not subject to valid, reasonable defenses. 
Pursuant to the statute, upon the employer or its surety contesting a Title 72 claim without 
reasonable grounds, " ... the employer shall pay reasonable attorney fees in addition to the 
compensation provided (by the Idaho Worker's Compensation Act)." I.C. § 72-804 is titled 
"Attorney's fees - Punitive costs in certain cases." (Emphasis added.) Clearly, the statute is 
intended to punish Title 72 employers and/or sureties which contest claims without reasonable 
grounds to the extent of paying " ... reasonable attorney fees in addition to the compensation 
provided by this law." 
Although certainly implied by the statute and so interpreted by the Court, language within 
the four corners of the statute does not state that "reasonable attorney fees" shall be paid either to 
the claimant or that claimant's attorney. Further, the statute does not require or even suggest that 
Title 72 defendants coming within the statute are obligated for the entirety of the fees due 
claimant's counsel. 
The effect of LC. § 72-804 1s that a Title 72 employer and/or its surety which 
unreasonably contests a claim is punitively assessed costs in the form of "reasonable attorney 
fees." The Title 72 claimant receives the benefit of those punitively assessed fees, 
addition to the compensation provided (by the Worker's Compensation Act)." 
Appellants' Reply Brief - 2 
" . ... 111 
Simply stated, what the Commission describes as, " ... the important purpose contained in 
Section 804, which is to make sure the injured worker is paid her full benefits without having to 
deduct legal expenses," is not found within the four corners of the statute or implied therein. 
Ironically, at pages 3-4 of its Brief, the Commission concedes that which goes to the very 
heart of the argument herein made by Appellants, that" ... a Section 804 award of attorney fees 
against the recalcitrant employer does benefit the injured worker, .... " Upon recognizing that an 
I.C. § 72-804 fee award constitutes a "benefit," it is obvious that the fee award comes squarely 
within the Contingent Fee Agreement between Ms. Page and counsel, which provides for fees 
upon a contingent basis of, 
" ... 25% of all of all benefits obtained for you by L. Clyel Berry prior to the date 
your claim is scheduled for hearing. Once hearing in the matter has been 
commenced, attorney's fees will then be equal to 30% of all benefits obtained for 
you by L. Clyel Berry. Following the filing of an appeal or if the matter is 
scheduled for rehearing, attorney's fees will then be 40% of all benefits 
obtained." (Emphasis Added). 
April 24, 2002 Contingent Fee Agreement, at paragraph 4 thereof. Exhibit 8, R. III. 
II. Course of Proceedings 
At pages 5-8 of its Brief, the Commission emphasizes the "Stipulation & Order 
Regarding Attorney Fees." Unfortunately, the Commission again takes poetic license in 
describing the September 8, 2009, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order; the parties' 
Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees, filed October 20, 2009; and, the Commission's Order 
Granting Stipulation, dated October 22, 2009. 
Appellants' Reply Brief - 3 
First of all, the September 8, 2009, Order did not award Ms. Page "her attorney fees." 
Rather, the Order merely stated that "Claimant is entitled to attorney fees." Secondly, the 
Commission's argument limiting counsel's fees to 30% of Title 72 benefits encompassed within 
the September, 2009, Order is based upon that which does not exist, excepting upon illusion 
created by the Commission. That illusion provides the basis for the Commission's statement at 
page 8 of its Brief, that "[t]he Commission's denials of Berry's requests to retain more attorney 
fees than that amount agreed to and awarded pursuant to the September 2009 Order forms the 
basis for the present appeal." 
The parties' October 20, 2009, Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees was never 
understood by Ms. Page or counsel to be the amount to which counsel was entitled as and for 
attorney fees pursuant to their Contingent Fee Agreement, nor was the same intended to modify 
or limit the same. Rather, the Stipulation was intended by the Title 72 Defendants and Ms. Page 
as being nothing more or less than was clearly indicated upon the face thereof, being " ... that 
attorney fees due Claimant by and from Defendants herein pursuant to the September 8, 2009, 
Award shall be the sum equal to thirty (30%) percent of the value of Title 72 benefits awarded 
Claimant by and/or encompassed within said September 8, 2009, Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order." Exhibit S-2, R.III. To co-equal extent, the Commission's Order Granting 
Stipulation, dated October 22, 2009, provided no hint that the Stipulation would modify or limit 
counsel's entitlement to fees pursuant to the Contingent Fee Agreement entered into between 
Appellants' Reply Brief - 4 
Ms. Page and himself. Rather, the Order merely noted "[t]hat the stipulation between the parties 
is GRANTED." Exhibit S-3, R. III. 
III. Statement of Facts 
Again, within the Statement of Facts portion of its Brief, the Commission makes a 
representation of fact which is not only clearly erroneous, but flies squarely in the face of the 
record. The Commission represents that, 
" ... Berry has included many matters in his Statement of Facts from Page's entire 
workers' compensation case. To the extent Berry asserts that this appeal revolves 
around Berry's entitlement to fees for his representation of Page throughout the 
entirety of these proceedings, the Commission submits the following correction . 
... The only issue on appeal here is the Commission's denial of Berry's request for 
additional attorney fees from one discreet sum of money - those awarded 
pursuant to the September 2009 Order and stipulation." 
To "clarify" what is and what is not at issue within the instant appeal, the Commission set 
forth a "Payment Summary" at page 10 of its Brief. Incredulously, the Commission attempts to 
convince this Court that the first three entries upon that Payment Summary, regarding which the 
Commission approved fees at only a 30% rate, are not encompassed within the instant appeal. 
Bluntly stated, the Commission could not be more wrong. 
The very crux of the instant appeal is exactly that which the Commission refuses to 
acknowledge. Central to this appeal is the fact that the LC. § 72-804 fee award within the 
September 8, 2009, Order was by reason of Defendants' conduct for one specific period of time, 
whereas Berry's entitlement to fees is pursuant to the Contingent Fee Agreement between Ms. 
Page and himself, which encompassed the entirety of his representation of Ms. Page throughout 
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her Title 72 proceedings, then spanmng multiple hearings and two appeals. Rhetorically 
speaking, did the Commission overlook Appellants' argument set forth within sections III.1. and 
V. of Appellants' Opening Brief? Further, could the Commission have overlooked issue 3, 
within the Issues Presented upon Appeal section of Appellants' Opening Brief? There, it is seen 
that the first three payments set forth within the Commission's Payment Summary are clearly 
encompassed within the instant appeal, to co-equal extent as benefits awarded by the September 
8, 2009, Order. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
At page 11 of the Commission's Brief, it "condenses" issues to be decided upon appeal to 
three, with the first two characterized as the calculation of Berry's Section 804 Attorney Fees to 
which," ... the paiiies stipulated to - and Berry assented - to the amount of the award," with the 
third encompassing constitutional violations. 
Again, the Commission muddles the facts. Overlooked and/or not recognized by the 
Commission is that counsel/Berry was not awarded LC. § 72-804 fees. The September 8, 2009, 
Order determined that "Claimant is entitled to attorney fees." The parties' Stipulation provided 
that, " ... attorney fees due Claimant by and from Defendants herein ... shall be the sum equal to 
30% of the value of Title 72 benefits ... encompassed within said September 8, 2009, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order." The Commission's October 22, 2009, Order Granting 
Stipulation merely provided "[t]hat the stipulation between the parties is GRANTED." 
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The Commission's argument is that counsel somehow "assented" to the I.C. § 72-804 fee 
award in lieu of fees to which he otherwise was entitled, by his signature upon the parties' 
Stipulation. This argument is premised upon the language within the Stipulation that, "COME 
NOW the parties, each by and through counsel ofrecord, ... and hereby stipulate .... " The actual 
language of the Stipulation does not give support to the Commission's argument. Rather, the 
Stipulation was clearly by and between the Title 72 parties, with the Stipulation's language and 
form being that of common usage to submit the Title 72 parties' agreement to the Commission. 
RESPONSE TO CERTAIN OF THE ARGUMENT ADV AN CED BY THE 
COMMISSION 
Upon Appellants' review of the Commission's Brief, arguments made therein by the 
Commission wammting response, are as follows: 
1. Whether the Commission Properly Calculated the Amount of Berry's 
Section 804 Attorney Fees to be Only That Amount Paid, as Attorney Fees, by the 
Employer? 
As response, Appellants first again note that this argument by the Commission is 
fatally flawed. As previously discussed, the record is clear that the I.C. § 72-804 fee 
award was not "Berry's." Rather, the September 8, 2009, Order was specific as to who 
was granted/awarded fees. Finding 40, at page 14, clearly determined that "Claimant is 
entitled to attorney fees." Paragraph 4 of the Order, at page 15, was specific that 
"Claimant is entitled to attorney fees." Berry was never awarded fees against Defendants 
Appellants' Reply Brief - 7 
111 this matter, to any extent. Further, neither by the parties' Stipulation nor the 
Commission's Order Granting Stipulation were I.C. § 72-804 fees "payable" to counsel. 
Rather, the parties' Stipulation clearly provided that the agreed fees were " ... due 
Claimant by and from Defendants, .... " The Commission's Order confirmed that, 
"The parties have agreed that, pursuant to the Commission's September 8, 
2009 decision, Defendants will pay to Claimant attorney fees in the 
amount of 30% of the value of the workers' compensation benefits 
awarded to Claimant by the decision." (Emphasis added). 
The Order thereafter simply provided "[t]hat the stipulation between the parties is 
GRANTED." Exhibit S-3, R. Ill. 
The Commission argues that, "[t]his issue is resolved simply by applying the 
language and rationale of Section 804 to the facts in this case." Appellants concur. It is 
clear that determining the meaning of an attorney fee statute and whether it applies to the 
facts or issues of law is freely reviewed by the Supreme Court. Smith v. Washington 
County Idaho, 150 Idaho 388, 247 P.3d 615 (2010). The Commission urges that the 
"plain meaning" of LC. § 72-804 be given effect. Again, Appellants agree. The "plain 
meaning" of I.C. § 72-804 is not to grant claimants additional compensation or benefits. 
Rather, the "plain rationale" of LC. § 72-804 is to dissuade a Title 72 employer and/or its 
surety from contesting claims without reasonable grounds. If I.C. § 72-804 applies, the 
Title 72 employer and/or that employer's surety is subject to a punitive award of attorney 
fees. The desired effect of I.C. § 72-804 is to "persuade" employers and sureties to 
Appellants' Reply Brief - 8 
accept Title 72 claims for which there is no reasonable defense. Thusly, Title 72 
claimants, both current and prospective, are benefited by the intended result of the statute, 
being that legitimate claims will be accepted. On a more narrow basis, to the extent of an 
I.C. § 72-804 award in a specific case, the claimant therein receives monetary benefit. 
To the extent of the September 8, 2009, award, additional issues presented by the 
instant appeal encompass: 
a. Is the claimant's "benefit" upon an I.C. § 72-804 fee award subject to fees 
by that claimant's attorney? 
(1) Upon the basis ofl.C. § 72-804 
Reviewing I.C. § 72-804, counsel first notes the obvious. 
Neither LC. § 72-804 nor any other provision of Title 72, Idaho Code, 
precludes or prohibits attorney's fees by Claimant's counsel upon an LC. § 
72-804 fee award. Further, the requested fees are not disputed by Ms. 
Page. Rather, at all stages of the proceedings, Ms. Page supported 
counsel's request for fee approval and specifically joined therein. Exhibit 
S-5, R. III. 
As noted by the Commission within its brief, I.C. § 72-804 
specifically provides that upon a fee award, " ... the employer shall pay 
reasonable attorney fees in addition to the compensation provided by this 
law." The Commission somehow interprets that language as prohibition 
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against counsel imposing fees upon a fee award pursuant to his contingent 
fee agreement. However, that interpretation is not suppmied by either 
specific language within the statute or any reasonable interpretation 
thereof. Rather, the cited language simply makes clear that the obligation 
for I.C. § 72-804 fees is separate, apmi from, and in addition to obligations 
for Title 72 compensation. 
(2) Upon the basis of IDAP A enactment 
Fees upon an LC. § 72-804 fee award are not prohibited by the 
Commission's enactment of rules within IDAPA 17.02.08.033. Rather, 
quite the opposite is true. Pursuant to the Commission's "Rule Governing 
Approval of Attorney Fees in Workers' Compensation Cases," the 
attorney's "charging lien" attaches upon "available funds," which are 
defined as funds which the services of counsel "operated primarily or 
substantially to secure." In the instant case, the totality of Ms. Page's Title 
72 recovery, inclusive of I.C. § 72-804 fees, was secured solely by reason 
of counsel's efforts, with the September 8, 2009, fee award being after 
years of litigation involving numerous fully contested motions, three 
evidentiary hearings before the Commission, and two Supreme Court 
appeals. 
Appellants' Reply Brief - 10 
As IDAPA 17.02.08.033 does not limit or define "available funds" 
by the nature or type of Title 72 monies recovered nor exclude an LC. § 
72-804 fee award therefrom, it is submitted that the requested fees, if 
otherwise reasonable, must be approved and allowed. At this point, 
Appellants note that the Commission's Orders below and Brief upon 
appeal omit any reference to (let alone discussion of) its IDAPA enacted 
"Rule Governing Approval of Attorney Fees in Workers' Compensation 
Cases." That omission was obviously intentional and by reason of the fact 
that there is no reasonable or rational defense to counsel's entitlement to 
fees against the I.C. § 72-804 fee award pursuant to said Rule. 
The penalties for a claimant's attorney's failure to fully conform to 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033 are extreme. As example, in Cheung v. Pena, 143 
Idaho 30, 137 P.3d 417 (2006), the claimant's attorney failed to conform 
to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.04, requiring that the Commission's guidelines 
for attorney's fees be disclosed to the claimant and that the claimant 
acknowledge receipt of the disclosure by signing the document. In 
Cheung, this Court upheld the determination of the Commission that that 
claimant's attorney forfeited all entitlement to fees, even where the terms 
of the fee agreement were not found to be otherwise unreasonable. Most 
Appellants' Reply Brief - 11 
ce1iainly, where a claimant's attorney is at risk for full forfeiture of fees 
for technical noncompliance with the IDAP A enactment, should it not 
follow that a claimant's attorney must be allowed reasonable fees in 
matters coming fully within the parameters of the Commission's "Rule 
Governing Approval of Attorney Fees in Workers' Compensation Cases?" 
b. The major purposes of I.C. § 72-804 are advanced by Berry's arguments 
The Commission argues that by enacting I.C. § 72-804, the legislature 
"sought to encourage Claimants to press claims which, but for such provision, 
would not be worth their time and effort once the costs of hiring an attorney had 
been deducted from the award," citing Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 
Idaho 13, 684 P.2d 990 (1984). However, Hogaboom also noted that I.C. § 72-
804 served the additional purpose of encouraging attorneys "to represent clients 
and take on claims which would otherwise not be in their best financial interests 
due to their relative financial insignificance." It is respectfully submitted that the 
Commission's argument is without basis in logic and, if accepted by the Court, 
would be counterproductive to and irreconcilable with the Court's earlier 
expressions in Hogaboom. 
As example, assume that a Title 72 claimant's potential benefits total 
$9,000.00, and hearing is required. Further assume that the claimant receives an 
I.C. § 72-804 fee award of 30% of said benefits, being $2,700.00. Thusly, the 
Appellants' Reply Brief - 12 
total sum received from Title 72 defendants is $11,700.00. Under the 
Commission's rationale, the claimant receives $9,000.00 and the claimant's 
attorney receives $2, 700. 00, the same amount the attornev would have received 
without an LC. § 72-804 fee award. Obviously, the Commission's rationale 
results in the attorney receiving no incentive for representing a claimant in a Title 
72 matter which, " ... would otherwise not be in (the attorney's) best financial 
interests due to relative financial insignificance." In fact, the attorney has less 
incentive to represent a Title 72 claimant in a matter of relative financial 
insignificance by reason of the added burden of prosecuting the I.C. § 72-804 
claim. Thusly, adopting the rationale urged by the Commission would actually 
have the effect of discouraging attorneys from representing Title 72 claimants in 
matters of little financial significance. 
Under the rationale urged by Appellants, the claimant's attorney receives 
30% (pursuant to the Commission's guidelines following a single hearing) of 
$11,700.00, being the total of Title 72 benefits and the I.C. § 72-804 fees awarded 
claimant, or $3,510.00. The claimant then receives $8,190.00. The attorney 
realizes $810.00 in added financial incentive for undertaking a Title 72 claim with 
little financial significance. The claimant's receipt of $8,190.00 equals 91% of 
the total value of Title 72 benefits awarded. Thusly, both the Title 72 claimant 
and that claimant's attorney are benefited. 
Appellants' Reply Brief - 13 
Absent a Title 72 claimant being able to secure the services of competent 
legal counsel, there is little potential that that claimant will recover any Title 72 
benefits from his claim. The rationale urged by Appellants results in higher 
probability that a Title 72 claimant will be able to retain legal counsel, and 
advances both of the stated purposes of I.C. § 72-804, being to encourage 
Claimants to press claims which otherwise would not be worth prosecuting and to 
encourage attorneys " ... to represent clients and take on claims which would 
otherwise not be in their best financial interests due to their relative financial 
insignificance." 
It is respectfully submitted that allowing counsel fees pursuant to the 
Contingent Fee Agreement between Ms. Page and himself is both mandated by 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c, promulgated by the Commission as the "Rule 
Governing Approval of Attorney Fees in Worker's Compensation Cases," and is 
necessary to achieve "sure and ce1iain relief' to injured workers, by encouraging 
attorneys to represent Title 72 claimants in claims regarding which those 
claimants could not otherwise secure representation. 
Appellants' Reply Brief - 14 
2. Whether counsel's fees upon the value of Title 72 benefits encompassed 
within the September 8, 2009, Order are limited to or "capped" by the LC. § 72-
804 fee award granted Ms. Page therein? 
In limiting counsel's fees to 30% of the Title 72 benefits encompassed within the 
September 8, 2009, Order, the Commission advised that, 
"The most impmiant fact in the assessment of attorney fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 72-804 and the Commission's September 2009 order in this 
case is that Counsel and Defendants came to an agreement as to the 
amount of attorney fees Defendants would nav counsel in satisfaction of 
the award of Idaho Code § 72-804 attorney fees. . .. Counsel chose to 
51ccept 30% attorney fees from the September 2009 order. The 
Commission will not award additional attorney fees on the same benefits." 
(Emphasis added.) 
R. III, pp. 121-122. Appellants' Opening Brief noted that not only was the 
Commission's stated basis in limiting counsel's fees unsupported of record, but that it 
actually misstated the clear record herein. The Commission's Brief argues that counsel 
"chose" to accept the 30% attorney fees provided by the parties' Stipulation as counsel 
had "signed off' upon and "assented" thereto. In essence, the Commission's argument is 
that by Berry submitting the parties' Stipulation to the Commission as Ms. Page's 
counsel of record, counsel "chose" to accept the fees due Ms. Page from Defendants in 
lieu of fees to which he was otherwise entitled pursuant to the Contingent Fee Agreement 
Appellants' Reply Brief - 15 
between Ms. Page and himself. The Stipulation is of record as Exhibit S-2, R. Ill. The 
entirety of the language is as follows: 
"COME NOW the parties, each by and through counsel of record, 
pursuant to the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order, dated and filed September 8, 2009, and hereby stipulate that 
attorney fees due Claimant by and from Defendants herein pursuant to the 
September 8, 2009, A ward shall be the sum of thi1iy (30%) percent of the 
value of Title 72 benefits awarded Claimant by and/or encompassed 
within said September 8, 2009, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order." (Emphasis added.) 
The Stipulation was then dated and signed by counsel of record upon behalf of the 
respective parties. Specifically, Berry signed the Stipulation as "Attorney for Claimant." 
The parties' agreement was presented to the Commission in the only 
manner it could, short of open hearing, being in the form of the Title 72 parties' 
Stipulation. The Stipulation was signed by both Attorney Mark Peterson, upon behalf of 
Title 72 Defendants, and Berry, as attorney for Ms. Page. Neither Mr. Peterson nor Berry 
were parties to that Stipulation and neither was bound by the terms thereof. Rather, each 
attorney acted within his representative capacity as counsel of record for their respective 
clients. 
The record in this matter is clear. Counsel for Ms. Page did not "choose" to 
accept the I.C. § 72-804 fee award in lieu of fees to which he was entitled pursuant to the 
Contingent Fee Agreement between Ms. Page and himself, or otherwise "assent" that his 
fees would be capped by the parties' Stipulation related thereto. 
Appellants' Reply Brief - 16 
In all bluntness, the argument made within the Commission's Brief that Ms. 
Page's counsel "chose" to accept the LC. § 72-804 fee award or "assented" to the same in 
lieu of fees to which he was otherwise entitled pursuant to the Contingent Fee Agreement 
between Ms. Page and himself flirts with if not constitutes clear violation of Rule 
1 l(a)(l), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, as obviously being not, " ... well grounded in 
fact, .... " 
If Beny' s fees are to be capped by the LC. § 72-804 fee award, the limiting of 
those fees must be upon the basis of LC. § 72-804; the IDAP A "Rule Governing 
Approval of Attorney Fees in Workers' Compensation Cases"; or, that the Contingent 
Fee Agreement by and between Ms. Page and counsel was not reasonable. 
J.C. § 72-804 provides no basis for capping or limiting of Claimant's counsel's 
fees to an LC. § 72-804 fee award. This Court earlier acknowledged that an I.C. § 72-804 
fee award may be different in amount to that which is due the attorney by that attorney's 
client. Hogaboom, supra, cited Berger, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees: What is 
"Reasonable"? 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 281, 282 (1977), for the proposition that, 
"Under either equitable or statutory rationales for fee awards, the amount 
the client agreed to pay the attorney does not necessarily determine what 
others should be compelled to pay by the Court. ... What constitutes a 
reasonable fee may be more or less than the client is obligated to pay the 
attorney." 
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684 P.2d 993. When applied to the facts of record in the instant matter, it becomes 
obvious that Ms. Page's counsel's fees must not be limited or "capped" by the LC. § 72-
804 fee award entered against the Title 72 Defendants. 
Punitive fees imposed against the offending employer/surety pursuant to LC. 
§ 72-804 must be "reasonable," from the perspective of those Title 72 defendants. In 
other words, fees imposed pursuant to LC. § 72-804 must be reasonable in relation to 
Title 72 defendants' offense giving rise to their obligation for fees. Dependent upon the 
circumstances, the employer could be found liable for fees encompassing the entirety of 
the Title 72 proceedings or only a portion thereof. As example, if the employer/surety 
had accepted a Title 72 claim and paid corresponding benefits excepting costs for a single 
medical presentment, which were unreasonably denied, "reasonable" fees to impose 
punitively should be in relation to the single denied medical procedure as opposed to the 
totality of the Title 72 claim. 
In the instant matter, the Commission's discussion of the LC. § 72-804 fee award 
within the September 8, 2009, Order is at Findings 34-40, at pages 12-14. There, the 
Commission found that Ms. Page was entitled to fees by reason of Title 72 Defendants' 
conduct "[f]ollowing the issuance of Page II, ... . " Specifically, Finding 39, upon page 
14 of the September 8, 2009, Order, determined that, 
"Under Idaho Code § 72-804, attorney fees are appropriate where the 
denial or delay in payments is unreasonable. Here, the record establishes 
that Defendants, for more than one year following the issuance of Page II, 
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had no basis for their denial. This is per se unreasonable." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Exhibit S-1, R. III. 
Clearly the attorney fees punitively imposed against Defendants was for conduct 
falling within a specific period of time, being from and following Page II to the April 9, 
2009, evidentiary hearing which resulted in the September 8, 2009, Order. That period of 
time did not encompass a Supreme Court appeal and required but a single evidentiary 
hearing. Pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.e.ii, "[i]n a case in which a hearing has 
been held and briefs submitted (or waived) under Judicial Rules of Practice and 
Procedure (JRPP), Rules X and XI, thirty percent (30%) of available funds shall be 
presumed reasonable."· Upon that basis, from the perspective of Ms. Page and counsel, 
Title 72 Defendants' responsibility for "reasonable fees" was set at thi1iy (30%) percent 
of the value of Title 72 benefits encompassed within the September 8, 2009, Order. The 
parties' Stipulation so provided. 
Contrasted with Title 72 Defendants' responsibility for "reasonable fees" for the 
period following Page II to the April 9, 2009, evidentiary hearing, Ms. Page's obligation 
for fees to her counsel was pursuant to their Contingent Fee Agreement of April 24, 
2002. Pursuant thereto, attorney fees were upon a contingent basis of, 
" ... 25% of all benefits obtained for you by L. Clyel Beny prior to the date 
your claim is scheduled for hearing. Once hearing in the matter has been 
commenced, attorney's fees will then be equal to 30% of all benefits 
obtained for you by L. Clyel Berry. Following the filing of an appeal or 
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if the matter is scheduled for rehearing, attorney's fees will then be 
40% of all benefits obtained." (Emphasis added.) 
Exhibit 8, R. III. 
As of the Commission's September 8, 2009, Order, counsel's representation of 
Ms. Page had encompassed a period in excess of seven and one-half years of active 
litigation, involving multiple fully contested and briefed motions; several evidentiary 
hearings before the Commission; and, two Supreme Court appeals, in stark contrast to the 
Title 72 Defendants' responsibility for LC. § 72-804 fees, which encompassed a period 
involving but a single evidentiary hearing. It is obvious that Defendants' responsibility 
for LC. § 72-804 fees bore no relation to Ms. Page's counsel's entitlement to fees for his 
years of work-product which cumulated in the Title 72 benefits encompassed within that 
September 8, 2009, Order. Thusly, Counsel's Petition for Approval of Fees should have 
been considered by the Commission upon the basis of LC. § 72-803, together with 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033 and controlling case law. 
It must again be remembered that the attorney fee issue before the Commission in 
the proceedings below and upon instant appeal does not involve any dispute by and 
between Ms. Page and counsel. In fact, quite the opposite is true. Ms. Page is fully 
supportive of her counsel's position in this regard. Tr. III, p. 23, L. 7 - p. 24, L. 18. 
Of note, within the April 10, 2012, IDAP A fee hearing, then Chairman Maynard 
advised that the Commission was not "questioning" the Contingent Fee Agreement of 
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Ms. Page and Counsel, but that the Commission was" ... not bound" by it. Tr. III, p. 32, 
LL. 12-14. In fact, the record is clear that the Commission refused to even consider the 
fee agreement in determining counsel's entitlement to fees upon benefits awarded by the 
Commission's Findings Upon Remand; the May 18, 2006, benefit payment; or, the 
September 8, 2009, Order. Within its June 21, 2012, Order on Attorney Fees, the 
Commission reasoned that it, 
" ... has no need to approve or modify the contingent fee agreement 
entered into between Claimant and Counsel. While instructive in 
determining the understanding of the parties at the outset of the case, the 
contingent fee agreement is not determinative of the fees to be awarded by 
the Commission in an award of Idaho Code § 72-804 attorney fees or 
Idaho Code § 72-803." 
R. Ill, p. 121. It is respectfully submitted that the Commission was in error. In Curr v. 
Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993), the issue, as here, concerned the 
Commission's approval of fees pursuant to LC.§ 72-803. There, the Comi stated, 
"Under LC. § 72-803, the Commission has a duty to approve or 
disapprove attorney fee claims. The basis for approval depends upon a 
finding that the fee agreement sails the wake of reasonableness. 
Reasonableness, in turn, derives from the totality of the circumstances 
from the perspective of the paiiies at the time that the fee agreement was 
made. Two cases, Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress and Clark v. Sage 
offer helpful, but not determinative factors to be thoughtfully considered 
when asce1iaining reasonableness." (Emphasis added.) 
864 P .2d at 136. 
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Had the Commission considered counsel's entitlement to fees other than upon the 
basis of the LC. § 72-804 fee award, the Commission would have approved fees at the 
contingent rate of 40% upon benefits encompassed within the September 8, 2009, Order. 
In approving fees of 40% upon the Title 72 parties' Lump Sum Settlement, the 
Commission noted, 
" ... the long road that this case has taken and the dogged persistence which 
(counsel) maintained through the years of litigation at the Commission and 
the Idaho Supreme Court. Claimant testified that it was counsel who 
pushed her along and had faith, even after unfavorable decisions, that the 
claim was valid and worth pursuing. Counsel's efforts in this case are 
beyond the ordinary case and the Commission finds that such an eff mi 
entitles counsel to a fee beyond the ordinary." 
R. III, p. 123. These comments by the Commission describing counsel's efforts in his 
representation of Ms. Page throughout the years are also fully applicable to the 
September 8, 2009, Order. 
3. The Commission did herein, to the same extent as Curr, sua sponte modify 
uncontested attorney fees absent clear guidelines 
The Commission's Brief argues that, " ... Curr (is) not at all on point with the facts 
of this case." The Commission argues that its rules governing attorneys' claims for fees 
were in effect prior to counsel being retained by Ms. Page. Such is absolutely true. 
However, IDAPA 17.02.08.033 provided no guidance as to what is or is not considered 
by the Commission to constitute reasonable fees past the initial hearing stage of Title 72 
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proceedings. Such was conceded by the Commission within its June 21, 2012, Order on 
Attorney Fees, where it noted that 
"While, as Counsel argues, the IDAPA does not have a specific fee 
percentage set for situations of cases that go to rehearing or on appeal, (the 
Commission) is able to handle the situations within the current 
framework." 
R. III, p. 122b. Unfortunately, the Commission apparently missed the points made by 
this Court in Curr and Rhodes v. Industrial Commission, 125 Idaho 139, 868 P.2d 467. 
Curr determined that, at a minimum, the Commission must" ... formally publish 
clear guidelines upon which it will base fee modifications in order to eliminate any latent 
arbitrariness." (Emphasis added.) Absent such, "[t]he net result of the Commission's 
sua sponte conduct is a deprivation of (the attorney's) property rights under the fee 
agreement without due process of law." In the instant matter, both upon review of the 
IDAPA Rule as well as upon consideration of the Commission's acknowledgement 
within its June 21, 2012, Order that there are no fee guidelines for Title 72 proceedings 
beyond the initial hearing stage, it is clear that the Commission did exceed its statutory 
authority in sua sponte modifying the uncontested Contingent Fee Agreement between 
Ms. Page and counsel. 
With respect to the Commission's position that it is "able to handle" fee approvals 
past the initial hearing stage, as expressed within its June 21, 2012, Order, the record 
speaks otherwise. In Rhodes, the Court stressed the importance of "predictability" in the 
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application of LC. § 72-803. Unfortunately, the only "predictability" in the Commission 
reviewing fees of claimants' attorneys beyond a 30% rate is that the Commission will 
require such efforts on the part of counsel so as to make those efforts economically 
imprudent upon consideration of any reasonable hourly fee and, as evidenced by the 
instant matter, there is total absence of "predictability," even within a single claim. 
As example, the Commission's April 1, 2010, Order Regarding Attorney Fees, of 
record as Exhibit 6, R. III, limited counsel's fees to 30% upon Title 72 benefits through 
the September 8, 2009, Order. Following settlement of Ms. Page's underlying Title 72 
claims, the Commission's Amended Order Approving in Part Stipulation and Agreement, 
dated December 9, 2009, of record as Exhibit S-8, R. III, limited counsel's fees to 30% 
upon all Title 72 benefits received, inclusive of that settlement. Following IDAPA 
hearing upon counsel's Fee Petition, the Commission's June 21, 2012, Order, ofrecord at 
R. III, pp. ! 18-125, approved fees of 40% upon the lump sum settlement, while limiting 
fees upon all other Title 72 compensation to 30%, and approved no fees upon the LC. § 
72-804 fee award. 
As of the instant Appeal, the Commission had approved attorney fees as follows: 
a. 30% upon Title 72 benefits encompassed within the Commission's June 
14, 2005, Order on Remand, following Page I; 
b. 30% upon the May 18, 2006, benefit payment, following Page I; 
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c. 30% upon Title 72 compensation encompassed within the September 8, 
2009, Order, entered following Page II and another evidentiary hearing; 
d. Denied fees upon the I.C. § 72-804 fee award within the September 8, 
2009, Order; and, 
e. 40% upon the value of the lump sum settlement between Ms. Page and 
Title 72 Defendants. 
The Commission enoneously rationalized limiting fees to 30% upon the value of the 
September 8, 2009, Order upon the basis of the I.C. § 72-804 fee award entered 
punitively against Title 72 Defendants, as previously discussed. However, the record is 
without discussion or expression of the Commission's rationale, whatsoever, in limiting 
fees to 30% upon benefits awarded by the June 14, 2005, Order on Remand and/or the 
May 18, 2006, benefit check, while approving fees at 40% upon the Title 72 parties' 
lump sum settlement. 
The entirety of Title 72 benefits paid in this matter were following appeal. There 
is absolutely no basis of record why fees upon benefits within the Order on Remand and 
the May 18, 2006, benefit check were limited to 30%, while fees upon the parties' lump 
sum settlement were approved at 40%. Such inconsistency of fee approval by the 
Commission within a single proceeding illustrates absence of the predictability 
anticipated by Rhodes, and the total inability of the Commission to discharge its 
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responsibilities for fee approval pursuant to I.C. § 72-803 under the framework of 
IDAPA Rules as currently enacted. 
The Curr Court determined that the Commission was required to formallv publish 
"clear guidelines" upon which it will base fee modifications, and noted that "[ w ]ithout 
properly enacted guidelines it is impossible for the Commission to exercise its duty to 
approve undisputed attorney fees under I.C. § 72-803." 864 P.2d at 139. Responsive to 
Curr, IDAPA 17.02.08.033 was enacted. However, even though the Rule specifically 
states that fee agreements shall be in conformity with Rule 1.5, IRPC, which provides the 
framework for different contingent fees upon settlement, trial or appeal, the Rule is silent 
as to what fees shall be presumed reasonable by the Commission in the event of appeal 
and/or re-hearing, and is thusly internally inconsistent and most certainly less than clear. 
Absent formally published "clear guidelines" as to what fee is presumed reasonable upon 
appeal or re-hearing, the facts and issues herein presented are exactly on all fours with 
Curr, which clearly must control. 
Upon consideration of the Hogaboom factors, discussed within paragraph 21 of 
the Affidavit of Berry in Support of Petition for Approval of Fees, of record as Exhibit 8, 
R.111, whether going forward from the April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement or 
viewed with benefit of 20/20 hindsight based upon results and looking back over the past 
11 year period of time, if fees at a contingent rate of greater than 30% are not both 
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reasonable and fully justified in the instant matter, rhetorically speaking how could they 
ever be? 
Curr recognized that a reasonable contingent fee must be "sufficiently high to 
compensate the lawyer not only for the reasonable value of the time he or she anticipated 
devoting to the particular lawsuit, but also for the time devoted to other lawsuits 
undertaken on the same basis but unsuccessful in result." 864 P.2d at 139. In Clark v. 
Sage, 102 Idaho 261, 629 P.2d 657 (1981), this Court observed that a contingent fee also 
involves a risk factor such that, " .. .lawyers generally will not provide legal 
representation on a contingent basis unless they receive a premium for taking that risk." 
In the instant matter, contingent fees at 30% fail upon both counts. 
Curr noted that Hogaboom recognized two general philosophies for the 
Commission to consider along with the Clark factors, being " ... to encourage claimants to 
pursue rightful legal claims and attorneys to take on such claimants' interests." 684 P.2d 
at 139. As noted by counsel during the April 10, 2012, IDAPA hearing, had counsel 
suspected that the Commission would deny fees in excess of a 30% contingent rate 
following appeals or re-hearing, he most likely would not have appealed the December 8, 
2003, original decision of the Commission, and Ms. Page would have received nothing 
from her Title 72 claim. Most certainly, following Page I and upon consideration of the 
Commission's Order on Remand, which awarded Ms. Page but 5% permanent partial 
disability inclusive of impairment, there would never have been a second appeal. 
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The June 14, 2005, Order on Remand awarded benefits totaling $12,375.75. 
Absent the second appeal, such amount would have been the total gross Title 72 benefits 
realized by Ms. Page's industrial claim. At the end of the day, counsel believes that the 
litmus test is whether the fees requested are not only "reasonable" upon consideration of 
the Hogaboom factors but, perhaps even more importantly, whether those requested fees 
are fair to counsel's client. 
Solely by reason of appeals being filed in this matter, Ms. Page's past medical 
expenses were satisfied; her future medical expenses provided for; and, indemnity 
benefits totaling in excess of $376,000.00 were recovered. The monetary value of Title 
72 benefits realized by reason of counsel's representation of Ms. Page herein totals 
$549,582.44, none of which would have been recovered but for the first appeal; only 
$12,375.75 would have been recovered but for the second appeal; and, benefits totaling 
$537,206.59 were recovered solely by reason of counsel's persistence and dedication to 
the interests of Ms. Page in convincing her of the merit of her Title 72 claims which 
warranted both the second appeal and, following Page II, further evidentiary hearings. 
Upon consideration of applicable statutes; the Commission's IDAPA Rule 
governing approval of fees; controlling case law; and, equitable considerations, approval 
of contingent fees herein at the 40% rate, as requested by both Ms. Page and counsel, is 
both reasonable and required. 
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CONCLUSION 
By its decisions, after repeatedly refusing to approve Ms. Page's counsel's fees greater 
than 30% upon any Title 72 benefits awarded herein, the Commission was finally persuaded to 
approve fees at a 40% contingent rate upon benefits encompassed within the Title 72 parties' 
lump sum settlement. In doing so, it acknowledged, 
" ... the long road that this case has taken and the dogged persistence which 
(counsel) maintained through the years of litigation at the Commission and the 
Idaho Supreme Court. ... Counsel's efforts in this case are beyond the ordinary 
case and the Commission finds that such an effort entitles Counsel to a fee beyond 
the ordinary." 
However, the Commission refused to approve fees greater than 30% upon Title 72 benefits other 
than encompassed within that lump sum settlement. Curr specifically determined that the 
Commission was required to formally publish "clear guidelines" upon which it would base fee 
modifications and advised that absent such, " .. .it is impossible for the Commission to exercise 
its duty to approve undisputed attorney fees under LC.§ 72-803." 864 P.2d at 139. 
Within its June 21, 2012, Order on Attorney Fees, the Commission freely conceded that 
it had not enacted guidelines, clear or otherwise, upon which it would base fee modifications in 
Title 72 matters following rehearing or appeal. R. III, p. 122b. Thusly, the instant case presents 
exactly as did Curr, with the Commission "sua sponte modifying uncontested attorney fees 
absent the guideline of a properly enacted regulatory scheme, .... " As such, as this Comi 
previously determined in Curr, the Commission exceeded its statutory authority. 864 P.2d 137. 
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Even as its successive orders denied fees greater than 30% upon Title 72 benefits, the 
Commission acknowledged that it was not "questioning" the Contingent Fee Agreement entered 
into by and between Ms. Page and counsel. Rather, it simply refused to consider that fee 
agreement. To the same extent, the Commission failed to discuss or follow IDAPA 
17.02.08.033.01.c, which it enacted as the "Rule Governing Approval of Attorney Fees in 
Workers' Compensation Cases." The Commission further failed to recognize that "reasonable 
fees" punitively assessed Title 72 defendants pursuant to LC. § 72-804 may well be different 
than "reasonable fees" to be approved upon behalf of claimant's counsel pursuant to LC. § 72-
803 and consideration of the Hogaboom factors. 
In limiting counsel's fees to 30% upon Title 72 benefits not encompassed within the 
parties' lump sum settlement, the Commission specifically found that, 
"The most important fact in the assessment of attorney fees ... is that Counsel and 
Defendants came to an agreement as to the amount of attorney fees Defendant 
would pay Counsel. ... Counsel chose to accept 30% attorney fees from the 
September 2009 order. The Commission will not award additional attorney fees 
on the same benefits." 
R. III, pp. 121-122. However, as previously discussed, that finding by the Commission, which it 
noted to be "the most important fact in the assessment of attorney fees," is without hint of 
suppo1i from the record herein. 
In summary, the Commission's findings and conclusions limiting counsel's fees to 30% 
upon Title 72 benefits not encompassed within the parties' lump sum settlement and denying any 
fees upon the September 8, 2009, LC. § 72-804 fee award were arbitrary, capricious and a 
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manifest abuse of discretion; not supported by substantial and competent evidence of record; 
failed to set forth specific findings required for meaningful appellate review; and, were not the 
result of the correct application of controlling statute, precedent or IDAP A enactment to facts of 
record. 
Appellants herein, being both Ms. Page and her counsel, respectfully request that the 
Commission's sua sponte reduction of fees herein be reversed. 
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